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This paper reports an analysis of press articles of selected Algerian francophone 
newspapers, which were published before, during and after a ‘friendly’ soccer game 
between the French and Algerian national teams on 6 October 2001, in the Stade de 
France in Paris. The paper seeks to identify how the ‘identity’ and sense of belonging 
of French-Algerians, known also as Beurs, Maghrebins, les émigrés de France, or 
Français-plus was located, negotiated in the Algerian journalistic discourse. It 
considers the manner in which concepts such as ‘culture’, ‘locality’ ‘nationhood’ and 
‘citizenship’ were mobilized to define or situate the identity of Algerian immigrants 
(or those of Algerian origin)  in comparison with that of Algerian (local-national) 
identity. The ‘friendly’ soccer game between the two national teams become a 
symbolic space, another occasion, for remembering the French-Algerian colonial 
past. Moreover, it represented an opportunity to reposition Algeria in the 
international (sporting) arena, and more importantly, to reassert social ties between 
Algerians, as part of the post-conflict process for national reconciliation. This was 
the product of more than ten years of generalised violence, which has been termed the 
‘second war’ (also la guerre sans images) of Algeria, after the first war for 
independence against French colonialism.  
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« …il me semble que le fait même d’écrire sur mes origines 
algériennes me montrent à quel point je ne suis plus exactement 
Algérien comme ceux qui sont restés là-bas, mais que je ne suis pas 
exactement Français comme ceux d'ici … »  It seems for me that the 
fact, in itself, of writing about my Algerian origins shows how far I am 
not exactly Algerian as those who stayed there, but I am not exactly 
French like those of here. (Azouz Begag, 1998). 
 
France greeted me with open arms … and that’s why I live here now.  
Here, I have the opportunity to perform 20 concerts a month with good 
musicians and good technicians.  That doesn’t mean I’ve forgotten my 
roots.  I feel fine almost anywhere in the world, but the place I come 
from is always a part of me.  In fact, it’s nonsense to separate these 
things.  Anyone with a modicum of intelligence can link the traditional 
with the modern world (Souad Massi, Algerian singer living in France, 
in Dombrowski, 2005). 
 
The core of our discussion is directed toward deconstructing the sense of being of an 
Algerian community (or of Algerian origin) in France.  I suggest that an analysis of 
(Algerian) media content around a ‘friendly’ international soccer game between 
France and Algeria can be used as lens through which to look to understand the 
process of making Beurs (word inverted from rebeus, which designates Arabs) and 
French-Algerian (called also Maghrébins, North Africans) identities.  Hence, the 
paper seeks to shed light on the importance of studying sport, not only as a form of 
practice but as a symbolic space for remembrance which may involve the process of 
forgetting (not yet forgiveness), or at least appeasing memory, of past Franco-
Algerian colonial history.  Furthermore, the staging of the soccer match between the 
two national teams was an occasion to reposition Algeria in the international sporting 
map and to re-assert Algerian social ties, an important constituent in the course 
toward post-conflict ‘reconciliation’ after more than two decades (since 1988) of 
generalised violence.  Before I begin the discussion about Algerian newspapers’ 
coverage (of pre- and post- game events between France and Algeria in 2001) in 
regard to the identity of the Algerian community in France, including that of French-
Algerians and French of Algerian origin, in order to comprehend the contemporary 
(conflicting) discourse(s) about Algerian national identity, I will first examine the 
impact of colonialism and decolonisation in that country.   
 
The Impact of Colonialism and Decolonisation in the Reconstruction 
of Algerian Identity 
Colonialism was one of the direct causes of (forced) immigration, the violent 
uprooting of thousands of Algerians who saw migrating to (then metropolitan) France 
as a means, sometimes the only one, of improving their economic and social 
conditions.  According to Manceron (1996), nowhere was the colonial ‘conquest’ so 
violent, brutal and radical in its destruction of the pre-existing social structure than in 
Algeria.  In the same vein, Khan (1991: 286) states that  
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[French colonialism] not only worked to expropriate the Algerian tribes and 
destroy the rural economy, but also to wipe out handicraft and guild-type 
organisation, pillage the cities, suffocate the few extant intellectual élites, steal 
or burn archival documents and entire libraries, wage ceaseless war on Arabic 
language and Islam, and try to drive them into permanent inferiority by setting 
up a native school system designed mainly to enhance a servile education 
necessary for the advancement of colonialism and a degree of acculturation 
apt to ensure the maintenance of foreign domination.  
 
 The damage caused by the violence of colonialism and decolonisation have 
affected the raison d’être of the Algerian sense of being.  It subjected the society to a 
real déculturation;1 the colonial past, after forty years of Algerian independence, is 
still at the roots of an unappeased conflict, described by Manceron (2002) as the latent 
tension between two (Algerian-French) memories.  This has prevented, or at least 
contributed in slowing down, the normalisation process between the two nations, 
making the task of organising and staging a ‘friendly’ soccer game between the two 
national teams a complex endeavour.  
 After Algeria’s independence in 1962, the flow of immigration continued for 
different political and socio-economic reasons.  One can argue that the reconstruction 
of identity based on total rupture between the coloniser and the colonised, achieved 
through revolutionary action where ‘the native would simply bury colonial society,’ 
did not happen as Fanon and Sartre predicted it would.2 
 That said, as a result of the official interruption by the French government of 
working immigration rules in 1974, the phenomenon previously conceived by migrant 
workers in terms of forced uprooting (déracinement) and displacement, turned to that 
of a permanent project of settlement (enracinement) and definite “sédentarisation” 
(Césari, 1998: 49).  Subsequently, a gap in the models of identification emerged, 
particularly for those of the second and third generations who are negotiating their 
identity today between the values of French universalism transmitted by the 
(republican) school and that of their parents’ original culture.  Both forms of identity-
making are in crisis.  The former because of the challenge of American (Anglo-
Saxon) hegemony, characterised according to Naïr (2003: 84) by the spiritualisation 
and essentialism of the particular (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious) sense of 
belonging, and the latter as a consequence of globalisation, synonymous for some of 
material civilisation and hyper-consumerism, which increased, according to 
Habermas, (in Borradori, 2003), the sense of fear of the violent uprooting of 
traditional ways of life.  Furthermore, the previous economic approach of the 1960s 
and 1970s toward immigration has given place to more political and cultural 
approaches, transforming the debate, previously discussed in terms of costs and 
advantages, to that of control of flows, citizenship-nationality, national identity, 
integration, Islam, communautarisme, multiculturalism (Withol, 1995). 
 
Soccer vector for ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’? 
As part of the Algerian struggle for independence, soccer ‘l’héritage de l’occupant’ 
was used to counter the colonial cultural hegemony on its own terms.  Sports clubs, 
after being a space for cultural “co-existence” between different ethno-religious 
groups, had become a place for the nationalist struggle for independence and, thanks 
to the FLN-team, an effective tool for the internationalisation of the Algerian cause.  
During the Algerian revolution (1954-1962), the FLN soccer team became a symbol 
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of Algerian resistance and struggle for independence, and therefore sport was viewed 
as an effective tool for international recognition of this struggle. According to Fates, 
the FLN succeeded, through its national soccer team, in ensuring an honourable 
participation in international life by achieving high quality sporting performances and 
thus becoming a model for other revolutionary movements fighting for their 
independence around the world (e.g. the Palestinian national soccer team). In this way 
the phenomenon of sport became an effective diplomatic tool for the promotion of the 
Algerian cause in international society. After independence, Algerian and French 
national teams met only twice.  The first “confrontation” was during the 1975 
Mediterranean Games held in Algiers.  Organising a mega event, such as the 
Mediterranean Games after only 13 years of independence (followed by the African 
Games in 1978) was an occasion for the Algerian government’s so-called 
‘revolutionary regime’ under the leadership of Boumedienne to show to 2700 athletes 
and 15 participant nations (and thus to the world) the first results of its socialist 
programme for development.  This is exemplified in the following El-Moudjahid 
newspaper reports: 
 
The revolutionary regime in Algeria has always accorded major importance to 
the youth of this country.  The proof is in the building of sports facilities in 
wilayates [departments].  This approach is symbolized by the Olympic 
complex of 19 June [the day of the military coup, called officially the 
readjustment of the Algerian revolution], where the Mediterranean Games of 
Algiers will take place.  …  Those projects were promoted for a precise 
objective, the building of a large-scale infrastructure aimed at facilitating the 
promotion of sports participation for all young Algerians … (El-Moudjahid, 
23 August 1975; original text in French).  
  
In Scagnetti’s (2003) terms, Algiers’ Mediterranean Games constituted an 
important sporting event in the history of the independent country.  Algeria succeeded 
in winning 30 medals, including 5 won by citizens of immigrant origin (a gold medal 
in boxing, 3 silvers in track and field and boxing, and two bronzes in judo and 
boxing).  The other important event during the Games was Algeria’s victory over 
France (the former enemy) in the soccer final.3  Algeria won the gold medal with a 
team coached by Rachid Mekhloufi.4   
 
The last ‘confrontation’ between the two national teams, the focus of this paper, took 
place on 6 October 2001, thirty-nine years after independence, in a soccer game 
which ought to be a new page in the relations between the two nation states.  But it 
finished in an unexpected manner, described by one Algerian newspaper as “a sad end 
for a historical match.”  
 Although it should be noted that the main objective of the paper is not to 
discuss the different use of soccer in the colonial and post-colonial eras, for 
nationalist, political and ideological purposes this part of the country’s sporting 
history has already been investigated by a number of Algerian and European scholars 
(Fates, 1994; Dine, 1994; Lanfranchi and Wahl, 1996; Lanfranchi and Taylor, 2001; 
Amara and Henry, 2003).  The paper is directed toward the study of an international 
soccer match which happened under different circumstances and of time, together 
with differing sporting and political contexts.  On one side, you have France, an ex-
coloniser of Algeria, which at the time was the World Cup holder and one of its best 
players, Zinedine Zidane, a French national of Algerian origin (voted on many 
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occasions as the personality of the year in France).  On the other side, you have 
Algeria, an ex-colony of France, its team managed by Rabah Madjer, the country’s 
first soccer superstar after independence (Dine, 2002) and supported by millions of 
Algerians in Algeria and elsewhere.  Particularly in France, where the Algerian 
community (or those of Algerian origin) represents the biggest immigrant community, 
their hope (at least in the way portrayed by the Algerian media) was to beat the 
French soccer ‘master’ (the world champions), as they had done in ‘the battlefield,’ 
forty years earlier.  
 As previously discussed, the major focus of this paper is the Algerian 
community living in France (called also Beurs, Maghrébins and North Africans – at 
least for a segment of this population – since the notion of Beur/Maghrébins/North 
African community masks great internal diversity of gender, class, generation, 
religiosity etc.) – for whom the soccer game between the two national teams was 
highly symbolic.  It was another occasion for the Algerian community in France to 
celebrate their own double sense of belonging to a ‘hybrid’ identity.  That is an 
amalgam of some aspects of both Algerian culture and French citizenship, neither 
expressed in terms of fully belonging to ‘French culture’ or that of (Algerian) ‘culture 
of origin.’  
 
Toward an Increased ‘Hybridisation’ of Identity 
The so-called Algerian immigrant population is today facing multiple dilemmas 
concerning the complexity of combining multiple identities:  (a) ethnic nationalism 
characterised by social, political and cultural ties to the motherland (pays d’origine), 
mixed with a universal sense of belonging to Islamic Umma (community of Muslim 
believers); (b) civic/civil nationalism, to express5 (at least for the second and third 
generations) their belonging to the French republican (laïque) values of democracy; 
(c) identification, specially for younger generations, with a global (transnational) 
youth culture, i.e. MTV, hip hop, Nike, NBA. 
 Césari (1998: 42) explains this complex variety of belonging(s) as the 
contradiction between individual, collective, and national identities.  The dialectic 
between these three (although not exhaustive) systems of identity making in the 
everyday life of populations of immigrant origin, and for younger generations in 
particular, can be illustrated with Kepel’s (1994) example of the French (republican) 
schooling system: 
 
…  In France, the Republican school is the place par excellence where the 
common belonging of pupils to the common laïque nation undermines 
individual differences.  It [the school as system and space] aims at training of 
equal citizens whose main reference is a sum of shared values – where there is 
no need for religious sphere to interfere because it is considered as part of 
private domain6 (Kepel, 1994: 165; translated from French).  
 
Moreover, the debate on post-colonial discourse is also a debate of the antagonism 
between two different (essentialist) world views.  The first could be described as 
‘universalist;’ propagating universal values of democracy and enlightenment, but also 
ethnocentric in presenting itself as the sole guardian of rational thinking.  It 
symbolizes the culture of the dominant (ex-coloniser) as the “only legitimate culture 
that could ensure the universal communication of knowledge” (Finkielkraut, 1987: 
77).  It is explained as well as being the most able to bring light (enlightenment and 
reason) to those dominated classes or ex-colonised nations – who were previously 
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deprived of ‘modern science.’  This universalist project, as asserted by Finkielkraut, 
who is usually criticised for privileging ethnico-religious arguments in his analysis of 
the French society, hides two missions:  (a) “un déracinement” or déculturation (the 
gradual loss of cultural distinctiveness) which consists of snatching a social group 
(ethnic-religious-linguistic minorities) from their web of habits and attitudes 
comprising their collective (ancestral) identity; (b) dréssage, or taming, characterised 
by the inculcation to the dominated group of the values (the ideal culture) of the 
dominant.   
 Today the impossibility of transcending those contradictions makes integration 
– particularly in the sense of assimilation as conceptualised in the French political and 
intellectual spheres – an unthinkable project. 
 The second world view can be described as ‘particularist.’  It is a discourse 
which calls for the return of ex-colonised societies to the communitarian logic of 
identity, in contrast to that of the neo- colonial (individualist) logic.  It separates the 
colonial and original cultures and refuses to accept any other “corrupted” form of 
culture, including that of a hybrid (Beurs) culture, which is considered as not identical 
and even an immoral deviation from the initial (motherland) local (Muslim) culture.  
 Building from the above discussion, we can argue that both universalism (in 
the name of enlightenment) and particularism (in the name of local identity) represent 
two faces of the same coin, i.e., nationalism. 
 Billig, in his discussion of the psychological, ideological and historical bases 
in the construction of nationalism (we and them), states that:  
 
We imagine ourselves and foreigners to be equally ruled by the sociology of 
nationhood.  This governing sociology produces countries in which we and 
them are reproduced as peoples bound both uniquely and universally to our 
places.  Armed with this vision of nationhood, not only can we claim to speak 
for ourselves but also we can speak for them, or for all of us (Billig, 1995: 83; 
emphasis added). 
 
In the same vein, it could be argued that the national identity of the French of North 
African origin have been constructed by the French media and political spheres on the 
foundation of French universalism (French republican values).  The universality of 
‘our’ French nationalism and ‘our’ secularism (laïcité) refuses or denies ‘their’ 
particularism, even in the name of ‘our’ pluralism and tolerance.  As Billig claims: 
 
… our tolerance is threatened by their presence; they are [les jeunes des 
banlieues] either intolerant or cause of intolerance; thus we seek to exclude 
them not because we are intolerant but, quite the reverse, because we are 
tolerant (Billig, 1991: 82; emphasis added). 
 
 The discourse of exclusion that particularly Maghrébins and the African 
community living in the French national space are facing, is often projected in a 
manner that ‘they’ are too ‘culturally different’7 to be absorbed into the French 
society.  The analysis of Algerian newspaper reports shows that these notions of 
differentiation when talking about the Algerian community living in France exist also 
within Algeria’s national space.  This time it is addressed in the name of ‘our’ 
(Algerian) ‘cultural identity’ and ‘authenticity,’ which views the success of ‘others’ 
(from Algerian origin) as a natural result of ‘our’ (Algerian) ‘specificity’ (the example 
of Zidane) and explains, on the other hand, ‘their’ social failure as a result of ‘their’ 
 223 
déculturation (Doukhan, 1998) which can be defined as the process of uprooting a 
social group – immigrant populations and minorities – from their web of habits and 
attitudes which comprise their collective (ancestral) identity.  The ‘collective self’ of 
‘us’ (in-group), representing Algerian national identity, and unity against any forms of 
violence, in comparison to ‘them’ (out-group - i.e. Beurs/ jeunes des banlieues) also 
exists (although with dissimilar meaning and intensity) in the discourse of Algerian 
journalists. 
 It could be stated that the tendency to include or exclude (consciously or 
unconsciously) individuals/groups into the Algerian national space, depends in 
today’s post-conflict process of rebuilding national unity in Algeria, on the attitudes 
(association/dissociation) of individuals/ groups with any forms of ‘violence,’ 
‘incivility’ and ‘disorder.’  This is what makes today’s process of rebuilding national 
unity in Algeria, emphasizing ‘reconciliation,’ different from that of (past) post-
independence strategies for nation-state building, which for some historians, have 
over-glorified the recourse to (legitimate) violence and armed struggle to attain 
independence.  Moreover, the analysis also confirm that 50 years after Algeria’s 
independence, the historical memory (du passé franco-algérien) is still evident in 
Franco-Algerian (sporting and non-sporting) relations8.  
 
Discourse and The Reformation of Identity  
It is argued that the making of an identity is not something discovered but which has 
to be made.  In the same line of reasoning, Said (2000: 315) claims that:  
 
To see others not as ontologically given but as historically constituted would 
be to erode the exclusivist biases we so often ascribe to cultures, our own not 
least.  Cultures may then be represented as zones of control or of 
abandonment, of recollection and forgetting, of force or of dependence, of 
exclusiveness or of sharing, all take place in the global history that is our 
element. 
 
Arguably, it could be stated that identity is a socially constructed reality, built on the 
logic of the differentiation process of ‘we’ that includes ‘our’ national, cultural, 
political, ideological and local identities, in relation to ‘others’ history, geography, 
traditions and life styles.  ‘Others’ become the antagonist (mirror-like) reflection of 
‘our’ self-identity.  For the purpose of this paper, data drawn from newspaper articles 
were used to analyse the perception of Algerian journalists about French-Algerians, 
also called Beurs, Maghrébins, Franco-Maghrébins, North Africans, les immigrés de 
France, les Arabo-Berber-Musulmans français, Français-plus (Hargreaves, 2001).  
They are also branded in the Algerian dialect as z’mmagra, usually used in a negative 
sense, to designate (particularly during the 1960-70s socialist period) Algerian 
‘others’ who come there every summer to show their material wealth and to confirm 
their (consumerist) cultural differences.  The aim of the analysis is to grasp these 
plural/conflicting realities surrounding the construction of immigrants’ (or from 
immigrant origins) identities in Algerian national newspapers.  This involves the 
homogeneity/heterogeneity and dichotomy doubleness existing between the 
designation of Algerian journalists of the ‘we’ (in-group) and ‘others’ (out-group).  
The paper argues that the designation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the Algerian context has 
been deeply affected by both past and present conflicts.  
 It should be emphasised that our focus is not a linguistic one, but is problem-
oriented, concerned with the language used by Algerian journalists to define or situate 
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Algerian immigrants’ identity in comparison to Algerian ‘local identity.’  For this 
rationale, articles from the Algerian francophone press, published before and after the 
game, were gathered.  The French (rather than Arabic) language was selected for its 
similarity with the history of soccer in Algeria.  Both cultures or modes of expression 
could be regarded as a product or the legacy of the French colonial society, absorbed 
and transformed (créolised) – at different stages of Algerian history – for diverse 
political and cultural ends. They were mobilised, at list during the colonial era,  by the 
colonial administration to affirm its dominance on French Algeria9, and by Algerian 
nationalist movement in its struggle for an independent Algeria. The creolisation of 
French language by Algerian intellectuals and leaders of Algerian revolution was 
described by Brian (2002), in line with Franz Fanon, as the process for a 
deterritorialization of French, the creation of a minor (Algerianized) French, in order 
to speed the breakdown of the French imperial relationship to Algeria10. In the same 
manner, Muslim soccer clubs became the place for the training of leaders of the 
national movement and for a wider political mobilization (Amara and Henry, 2003)11. 
Furthermore, the media landscape in Algeria is extremely diverse with about thirty 
daily newspapers and about 150 weekly or monthly newspapers, mostly state’s owned 
and the rest, the leading ones,  are privately owned by cooperative of journalists and 
businessmen (e.g.  Issad Rebrab, the owner of Cevital, the leader of oil and sugar 
industries in Algeria, is the co-owner of Liberté newspaper) . However, apart from the 
daily arabophone newspaper, El Khaber, which has the highest circulation rate with 
400 000 copies per day, francophone newspapers, have a greater readership, reaching 
broad segments of the literate-urban population (most of the Algerian urban 
population lives in the northern 10 percent part of the country)12. 
The other point that needs to be raised concerning the selection of newspapers 
is the issue of accessibility.  Only those newspapers electronically available or with 
free access online archives at the time of collecting data (in 2002) were selected.  
More Algerian newspapers are electronically accessible today but not all offer access 
to online archives.  Finally, even though the question of representativeness in the 
quantitative sense of the term is not a concern for this paper, because of the qualitative 
nature of the study, it could be argued that the selected national newspapers are still 
the main elements of the Francophone (or Francophile) press in Algeria. 
 The selected newspapers are usually classified (in ideal type) for their editorial 
line as liberal (laïque) such as private owned newspapers El-Watan, Liberté and Le 
Matin; centrist, for example La Tribune; nationalist-conservative, for instance the 
state owned newspaper El-Moudjahid.  Having said this, it should be emphasized that 
the distinction between democrats-liberal versus conservative-nationalists in the 
Algerian politico-intellectual arena is not clear cut.  Algerian journalists paid a high 
price (113 journalists were assassinated between 1992-1998) because of their 
positions, or the nature of their work, in what is now portrayed as the red decade, to 
describe more than ten years of civil war in Algeria (a term which is still unsaid for its 
sensitivity in a nation which declared itself to be unified in its struggle against 
colonialism).  Secondly, all Algerian newspapers are still dependent in their day to 
day management (e.g. printing and publicity) on public funds, which makes them 
politically and financially vulnerable13.  Thirdly, the meanings of nationalism and 
conservativism, on the one hand, and liberalism and democracy on the other (at least 
in its actual form of a controlled, top-down multiparty system), which were presented 
in the past socialist Algeria as contradictory concepts, are accepted today, in post-
socialist and post-conflict (yet to be achieved) Algeria, as the norm by all political and 
social movements. 
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 It needs to be noted here that the present political debate in Algeria is oriented 
toward re-negotiating the sense of both:  
 
(a)  modernism; which accepts some notion of progress and controlled 
political pluralism (but not necessarily the secular values of western 
modernity). Incorporating also (modernist) Islamist parties which are present 
members of the government coalition;  
(b)  radicalism, associated with those armed movements which reject the 
notion of the Algerian state, declared to be the (poisoned) legacy of 
colonialism, calling instead for the return to the Umma or nation of believers.  
That said, in the aftermath of the massive popular vote in 2005 for the 
president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a project for national reconciliation may lead 
in the future to a general amnesty.  The meaning of “radicalism” usually 
applied in the official political discourse refers to armed groups and is in itself 
in the process of continuous redefinition involving only those armed groups 
refusing to put an end to violence and to join the platform for national 
reconciliation. 
 
 
Algérie-France, 6th October 2001 
The organisation of the ‘friendly’ game was agreed upon by the two governments a 
year before in 2000, after the visit of Algerian president Bouteflika to France.  We 
should highlight here the highly historical significance of the 6th October 1961 date in 
the Algerian collective memory.  Particularly for those Algerian immigrants who 
lived and witnessed the struggle for independence from ‘metropolitan’ France (since 
Algeria was a province of France), it was the day when the chief of the Police, 
Maurice Papon, famously known for his repressive methods, decided as part of 
security measures against what were described as ‘criminal activities of FLN 
terrorists’ to establish a curfew for Algerians living in the suburbs of Paris from 8:30 
pm to 5:30 am.  Following this decision the FLN, which managed to impose itself as 
the sole representative of the revolution in Algeria and elsewhere, decided to organise 
a large and peaceful demonstration in the centre of Paris for the night of 17 October.  
The response of the national police was extremely violent.  Hundreds were massacred, 
and their bodies were thrown in the river Seine, or imprisoned (including everyone 
who looked like a North African, i.e. southern Europeans who happened to be in the 
wrong place that day).  A dark page in Algerian-French history which has still to be 
opened. 
 The international soccer game was also played while the world media, 
politicians, sociologists and historians were busy discussing the aftermath of the 11 
September attack in New York and its consequences for world security as well as the 
manner in which the US was going to respond to stop the treat of ‘world terrorism.’  
The latter is claimed to became after the end of the Cold War the new threat to world 
stability and western democracy. In this context of hypertension, a security plan 
named ‘Vigipirate’ to thwart the menace of another terrorist attack on French territory 
(after that of 1995 bombing) was reactivated.  The objective was to face the threat of 
what the French media, particularly after 11 September, described as sleeping cells 
(les cellules terroristes dormantes).  In addition, the match was played at a time when 
France was still under the shock of another tragedy, the explosion of a chemical 
factory in Toulouse.  First, the French media attributed it to ‘Islamist’ groups, but 
after investigation it was established to be an accident brought about by a technical 
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failure and human neglect.  For El-Moudjahid newspaper, this was another occasion 
for the enemy of Algeria and “some mistaken associations which cultivate hatred of 
Algeria … to tarnish the image of Algeria and displace the match from its normal 
context, while placing pressure on the organiser to cancel it.”  According to the same 
newspaper, the French media wanted at all costs to link the match between Algeria 
and France with ‘terrorism.’  This was described as “the fruit of fertile imaginations – 
des scénaristes de l’information – of news’ scriptwriters” (El-Moudjahid, 09/10/01).  
 However, for the majority of Algerian newspapers the match was a historical 
moment.  According to Liberté, 
 
“[the match] is highly symbolic for our country, which will face France for the 
first time after the independence.  But this time in a soccer field …  it will be a 
battle between two countries which have lived through difficult times” 
(Liberté, 07/10/01).  
 
The same newspaper chose to cover the pre-match atmosphere in the streets of Paris, 
particularly those known for their important concentration of the Maghrébins 
community: 
 
“Algerian immigrants succeeded to create an outstanding atmosphere … in 
Barbés.  They were hundreds to go out to express their joy and pride … they 
even stopped traffic for one hour, to transform the street to a panorama of a 
mega festivity” (Liberté, 07/10/01). 
 
 The act of stopping the traffic for an hour, even if not legally authorised, is 
justified as an expression of joy and festivity.  This could only happen in the 
multicultural streets of Barbés, which reinforces, at least in the reporter’s account, the 
distinctiveness/uniqueness of Barbés as a space, inside (outside) French territory.   
 According to El-Moudjahid (09.10.2001), the soccer match was a meeting in 
the service of “an appropriate and sought after fraternity.”  As for El-Watan, the 
match was a challenge and an occasion to de-sensitise (décomplexer) “passion, 
nostalgia, and suspicion … in the relations between the two nations.  As a 
consequence, soccer, this highly mediated activity, becomes for this occasion the most 
appropriate tool, “to go beyond certain direct and indirect [psychological and 
historical] blockages” (El-Watan, 07.10.2001).  
 One can argue that journalists’ language used to describe the pre-game 
atmosphere reinforced the attitude, the readiness, of Algerians toward forgetting (and 
even forgiveness) of the colonial past, with the hope that this feeling was shared 
among the French population and political leaders.  To illustrate this position, we can 
read in Le Matin’s article that those types of events could serve as a bridge between 
two countries, linked most of the time by a passionate and conflicting history.  Above 
all, “because of the international events [post 9/11] …which have transformed more 
instinctive the rejection of others and normal the distrust of foreigners, the source of 
evil” (Le Matin, 07.10.2001).  
 
 
Le Jour J 
The following are the words chosen by a reporter from Liberté newspaper to describe 
the atmosphere before the kick off:  
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“19h29 French time, Stade de France, “les verts” get into the field ... 
everybody stood, shouting “One, Two, Three, viva l’Algérie.”  We felt to be in 
the 5th July temple [referring to the Algerian Olympic stadium] … the world 
champions [except for Zidane of course] were welcomed as if they were 
playing outside their base, by thousands of Algerian supporters coming from 
all over France.” 
 
France has discovered other colours:  green, white and red [the Algerian flag] 
…  It was simply magnificent, with all supporters standing for Tahia El 
Djazair [long life to Algeria] … sublime images which only soccer knows how 
to produce.  The participation of Dahleb and Zidan’s kick off, the two 
symbolic figures of plural Algeria,14 announces the starting of the game. 
(Liberté, 07/10/01) 
 
 All this happened in a stadium, according to Liberté newspaper, which had 
known the joy and triumph of the French “melting pot” (Black, Blanc, Beur) during 
the World Cup final, but which for this occasion has given an image of a “conquered 
territory.” 
 The same mixed feelings of pride, joy and hyper-nationalism were expressed 
by other daily newspapers.  One of El-Watan’s reporters had even claimed that “… 
we had the impression to be in the 5th of July stadium” (the biggest stadium in 
Algeria, named after the day of independence). 
 
“Supporters’ hearts present that night belonged only to the green of Algeria, 
and Kassaman [the Algerian national anthem] … was sung in an enclosure 
which has borrowed its voice to be the echo for a strong presence of Algerian 
supporters.” 
 
On the other hand, la Marseillaise was faced by protest15 by the so-called les jeunes 
des banlieues (the youth of suburban Paris) who waited for this occasion, according to 
the same newspaper, to  
 
“take a psychological step upon the social difficulties that they are going 
through … the Algerian flag raised by les jeunes des banlieues was largely 
dominant…”.  
 
It was an occasion for Algerian supporters to express their identities: 
 
“the Algerian flag had occupied the French land, at least for the time of one 
night” (El-Watan, 07/10/01).  
 
 It is worth highlighting here ways that the notion of space, being inside or 
outside Algerian/ French land, and thus of “our” and ‘their’ supporters present that 
day in Stade de France, was constructed.  The same supporters of the Algerian 
national team were one time described as Algerian (like ‘us’) and another time as les 
jeunes des banlieues.  The place itself, the famous Stade de France, became the 5th of 
July stadium in Algiers and therefore part of Algerian territory.  Thus the 
displacement of space caused also a displacement of supporters’ identities.  The voice 
of ‘other’ French (including those of North African origin) supporters, who may have 
represented the majority that day, became nearly silent and therefore absent.  
 228 
 
After 76 Minutes of Official Time  
The atmosphere described above of partying and joy and of a soccer match 
supposedly between two nations sharing hard moments of history, but willing to 
forget and even to forgive, was bungled by what Liberté (7/10/2001) described as 
‘prétendent supporteurs’ or pseudo-supporters of the Algerian national team. 
 
“the happiness was transformed to sadness, real supporters des verts, do not 
find the words to describe their desolation…” 
 
After 76 minutes of official time, while the score was 4-1 for the World champions, 
the referee decided to stop the game16. The reason was  ‘envahissement de terrain’, 
supporters spilling out into the pitch portrayed by the same newspaper as  
 
“they were rascals who emerged from nowhere and they have nothing to do 
with Algerians… Shameful, despicable, the words are never strong to describe 
what really happened”. 
 
According to El-Watan,  
 
“it was a violent form of expression by a group of ‘jeunes Beurs’ 
marginalized, who waited for this occasion to protest against their social 
exclusion…By the fault of a well determined group … a bench of agitated 
supporters who came to spoil the party” (El-Watan, 07.10.2001).  
 
Many reactions were offered to explain what happened.  For some journalists, it was 
the expression of internal (French) socio-economic problems and the failure of those 
in charge of security in Stade de France.  Other newspapers chose to minimise, or at 
least to de-dramatise, the importance of the incident.  
 For La Tribune (08/10/2001) the interruption to the game was another aspect 
of the continuous history of conflict between Algeria and France “which does not 
have an end.”  In El-Moudjahid’s view, the incident was in fact a “banal” event and 
an “isolated” act of “two or three agitated supporters.” 
 
“…There was absolutely not a will of violence by those who swept onto the 
pitch…they entered for the sole reason to express their enthusiasm and joy 
without violence or aggressiveness…”  (El-Moudjahid , 09/10/2001). 
 
In a similar vein, the journalist from El-Watan (09.10.01) claimed that the event was 
unpredictable and irresponsible, but non-violent. 
 
“… There was a sympathetic sweep onto the pitch … by number of supporters 
who wanted to live the party much closer”.  
 
 The same newspaper pointed out that in addition to Algerian supporters, who 
spilled onto the pitch, there were also others from Tunisia, Morocco, Portugal:  
 
“a multitude of nationalities not animated by bad intentions but not safe 
though from manipulations … despite the negative effect of such irresponsible 
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behaviour aggravated by minority of supporters, we are far from the 
hooliganism that European and French stadia are so familiar with”. 
 
“In other places hooliganism is a fashion, causing enormous damage.  In this 
perspective we cannot teach neither the French or the initiators of soccer 
[English] who have had at numerous occasions to witness much more serious 
scene” (El-Watan, 08/10/2001).  
 
 For El-Watan and El-Moudjahid, those in charge of Stade de France security 
were held responsible for what happened 15 minutes before the end of the game.  The 
others responsible are, of course:  
 
hidden groups whose sole obsession is to derail the train of friendship between 
Algeria and France (El-Moudjahid, 09/10/01). 
 
The different positions of Algerian newspapers in discussing the significance, and the 
moral responsibility for what happened, divided between aggravation and de-
dramatisation and using terms ranging from despicable to sympathetic to clarify what 
‘really’ happened, can be explained as part of the ongoing reconstruction 
(renegotiation) process of what is acceptable, common, suspect and unjustifiable in 
the present Algerian post-conflict outlook.17  Some Algerian newspapers reasserted 
that aspects of public disorder and incivility (provoked by a minority) are not unique 
to Algerian supporters.  Acts of hooliganism (more serious) take place week in and 
week out in the European stadia (e.g. in France and England) as a reminder of the 
global dimension of this phenomenon, and thus an argument against the ethno-cultural 
explanation of violence which tends to associate violence (thus terrorism) solely to 
Arabo-Muslim culture . 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it could be stated that the construction of Beurs/French-Algerian 
identity, etc. – at least in the account of Algerian newspapers – varied considerably.  
This could be assumed to be linked to the following issues:  (a) the influence that 
colonial history had, and still has, in the definition and positioning of Algerian 
immigrants’ identities in French society; (b) the projects for society, i.e. liberal versus 
conservative (although it is hard to distinguish between these two political positions in 
the Algerian context) which each of those Algerian newspapers adhere to; (c) the 
recent history of internal generalised violence and the process of post-war trauma 
Algerian society is going through.  It imposes a certain revision, re-examination, and 
renegotiation of the meaning of what it is to be an Algerian,18 and the conditions 
which contribute to prevent the recurrence of collective violence (as a means for 
political change) in the Algerian society.  
 The general observation we could make from our analysis is that the Algerian 
press employed multiple uses of rhetoric to portray the identity (psychological types) 
of Algerian supporters, incorporating (consciously or not) dual and antagonist types of 
categorisation.  The same Algerians (supporteurs des verts) previously depicted as 
members of the Arabo-Berber and Islamic community, and Maghrébins proud of their 
cultural distinctiveness and ‘their’ Algerian flag, had become in a space of 76 
minutes, “rascals who emerged from nowhere and they have nothing to do with 
Algerians or Algeria.”  They were also described as Jeunes Beurs, marginalised, who 
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waited for this occasion to protest against ‘their’ (thus nothing to do with Algeria) 
social exclusion, in France (‘their’ homeland). 
 Other newspapers such as El-Watan and El-Moudjahid preferred to talk about 
a minority of ‘sympathetic’ and ‘non-violent’ jeunes Beurs, who were not safe from 
manipulation by ‘hidden forces.’  In other words, the French media were depicted by 
Algerian newspapers also as ‘scriptwriters of fictional news’ in reference to their 
negative portrayal of Algeria between 1992-1998, during the hardest period of 
internal political violence.  Their main aim, from the Algerian perspective, 
particularly El-Moudjahid’s (the official government newspaper), was to tarnish the 
image of Algeria and to destroy any chance of amity and partnership between France 
and Algeria.  
 A comparison of French and Algerian press discourses regarding the match 
event, particularly in connection with the reaction and behaviour of the so called 
Beurs and Maghrébins supporters, before, during and after the game, could deliver 
some aspects of the complex identity that this category of population is going through 
today.19  A comparison between Francophone and Arabophone newspapers in 
Algeria, knowing the sensitivity of the debate between Francophones and 
Arabophones around the building of post-independent Algeria,20 can also shed light 
on interesting themes.  
 It could be stated that the problem of identity (not to forget the socio-
economic problems) among the Beurs/Franco-Maghrébins population in France (not 
to use the term ‘minority,’ being highly sensitive in the French republican context) 
can be located in the complex and ambivalent sense of living in ‘between-ness’ and 
even ‘emptiness.’  This may be more pertinent for the third generation.  This is a 
generation, according to Breviglieri, whose immigrant consciousness is not 
questioned.  Therefore, the issue of integration their parents had to deal with should 
not be part of their daily life problems for the simple reason they consider themselves 
as French ‘like others.’  Their view about their (parents’ or grandparents’) societés 
d’origine (le bled) is not always nostalgic, but it is equivalent also with étrangeté 
(foreignness), political totalitarianism, corruption, imposed (selective) history,21 
political violence and social inequality (Geisser & Kelfaoui: 2001).   
 
Ici [in France], we are in the presence of a generation, that naturally ‘forget’ or 
they do not find indispensable to possess patrimonial culture22” (Doukhan, 
1998).   
 
 We should mention here the specificity of the Harki population in France and 
their descendents (second and third generations), which are absent (silenced) in the 
Algerian newspapers’ analysis of pre- and post-game issues between France and 
Algeria.  Harkis are the Algerian Muslim23 population who chose (or it was imposed 
upon them) to fight against their fellow Muslim Algerians to uphold French 
colonialism in Algeria.  For this category of the population, the previously discussed 
notions of forgetting and the possibility of forgiveness in relation to the Franco-
Algerian past are impossible or difficult to conceive.  Because they chose to fight for 
the French flag against Algerian independence, and therefore against a Muslim 
Algeria, they thus (voluntarily) decided to be part of the French national space for 
ever.  Consequently, to be accepted or not as Harki (for cultural or religious reasons) 
in the French national space and history, becomes an internal French problem.  The 
same rhetoric of Harki or fils de Harki (the sons of Harki) “who are thirsty for 
vengeance against Algerian independence” was used by the media, and by the 
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Algerian government to depict the armed groups.  By doing this the Algerian 
authorities contributed, according to Harbi, in bringing to the surface all these 
unresolved historical issues concerning the Algerian war for liberation (1954-1962).  
As he puts it, 
 
“[regarding] questions such as terrorism against civilians, Harkis, Algerian 
cultural identity etc.  We have to remind ourselves that some political groups 
in Algeria, particularly those who are against the Islamist project [to establish 
an Islamic state], sought in the last years to carry the internal Algerian conflict 
into France.  The problem is not to be against the Islamists.  They have enough 
convincing arguments why they are against the Islamist project.  The problem 
is in the discourse that these groups utilise which is close to the discourse of 
French settlers [pied noirs] and most French political factions which are 
embittered by the Algerian cultural experience after independence” (Harbi 
2006, from Aljazeera news web page, translated from Arabic).  
 
 The constructed stereotype, while referring to the specificity or particularism 
of Maghrébins, which is usually presented as one homogeneous group, is projected 
(consciously or not) with a logic of differentiation, if not exclusion.  For instance, 
when talking about national belonging, cultural identity and religious faith, the image 
projected by the media (in Algeria and France) is that of struggle, identity crises, 
violence, chauvinism, fundamentalism and isolationism.  It is characterised also by le 
repli (the-tactical-return) toward the community, family and religion (i.e. the process 
of ghettoïsation), an image which Geisser and Khelfaoui (2001) reject and describe as 
dramatic, discriminatory, and even pathologic.  The origin of that negative imagery 
has roots, according to Césari, in past colonial history, with consequences still 
persistent, particularly in the social imagination of the French.   As Césari points out, 
 
“Those young are victims of post-colonial syndrome, which makes [their] 
Arab and Muslim origins the object of a sum of negative imagery which is 
rooted in the colonial past” (Césari, 1997:39). 
 
This is to say that what is needed today, more than a symbolic ‘friendly’ soccer game, 
is un travail de mémoire, in other words a de-colonisation (deconstruction) of the 
shared memory between France and Algeria.  This memory has only been established 
in terms of invasion, conquest, battles, domination, defeats, victories; in other words, 
through war and violence.  A product also of an ideologised history on the one hand, 
as well as a selective memory on the other hand.  A tendency, according to Ravenel 
(1996), for amnesia (even negations24) on the French side and that of hyper-
commemoration on the Algerian side.  
 I finish the paper in the same way I started by quoting, this time from Tahar 
Ben Jelloun’s novel, Les raisins de la galère.  This perfectly describes the pluralist 
(double, and even ambiguous) sense of belonging to the French among those of 
Algerian origin (represented in the novel by Naima): 
 
“We were conceived in an improvised manner, for the provisory, we are the 
children of the cities of transit, we arrived without warning … we found 
ourselves living here with human-like faces, expressing ourselves with 
civilised-like language, and with French-like manners and customs, we are 
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here, and what is left for us [to do] to deserve staying here [in France]?” (Ben 
Jelloun, 1996:117; translated from French by the author) 
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NOTES 
 
1. Described by Bourdieu as a catastrophic experience of social surgery, “the war 
made a clean sweep of a civilisation which we only can speak about today as part 
of the past” (see Bourdieu, 1974: 123; translated from French). 
2. On the intellectual debate about Algerian war of revolution see Le Sueur (2001). 
3. This symbolic sporting victory intervened after the (first) official visit, from 10 to 
12 April 1975, of the president of the French Republic, Valery Giscard D’Estang, 
to independent Algeria. 
4. In April 1958, Mekhloufi (named by Boudjedra 1981, as ‘le footbaleur de la 
révolution’ in a novel dedicated to the FLN team) abandoned the French national 
team, which was preparing for the World Cup finals in Sweden and instantly 
became an Algerian national symbol. A few months earlier he had been part of a 
French team that won the world military soccer competition in Buenos Aires on 
Bastille Day, 14 July 1957. (See Lanfranchi and Wahl, 1996; Amara and Henry, 
2004) 
5. Through institutionalised channels, such as the act of voting as well as 
participation in political and other associative (and non-political ) activities.   
6. The school system in Britain, which is not considered “laïque” in the French 
term, functions according to another logic, that reflects the disassociation 
between citizenship and nationality (see Kepel : 1994).  
7. The core justifications of cultural differentiation is based particularly on 
presumed attitudinal differences toward separation of religion and state  (see 
Lamont et al., 2002). 
8. At the time of writing this article, the Algerian President Bouteflika has asked the 
French government to officially recognise its crimes against humanity in Algeria 
as a precondition for the signing of traité  d’amitié between the two countries.  
“Bouteflika persiste et signe, La colonisation française a été brutale et 
génocidaire”, Liberté,  Edition N° 4145 du Lundi 08 Mai 2006. 
9. To increase the foreignness of the Arabo-Islamic cultures of pre-colonial Algeria, 
Arabic was declared as a foreign language , in French-Algeria. 
10. French language has become, as the Algerian writer Kateb Yacine has said, one 
of the spoils of war. 
11. The majority of the names of ‘indigenous’ clubs began with the words ‘club 
Musulman’, or ‘Union sportive Musulmane’. Islam was thus a fundamental 
element and symbol of differentiation, between Muslim and non-Muslim 
(European settlers) clubs. 
12. The Arabic, Berber and French languages are all connected to the country’s 
history and culture. For Berger (1998: 61) “many Algerians, perhaps the majority, 
live in several languages, often switching from one to the other in the same 
sentence. To deny Algerians the possibility of being at the same time Arabophone 
and Berberophone, or Berberophone and Francophone, might amount to denying 
them the very possibility of being Algerian”.  
13. For instance, Le Matin newspaper is no longer in the market and at the time of 
writing its director had been in jail since 14 June 2004 for “financial infraction”. 
He was released on 14th June 2006. 
14. Zidane and Dahleb because of their creativity and soccer performance have 
become the symbols of “plural Algeria”, and not that of “plural France”. 
15. La Marseillaise faced the same protest by the supporters of FC Bastia (from 
Corsica) in the French Cup final against L’Orient held on 12 May 2002. In this 
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form of protest, supporters showed their objection to Chirac’s policy regarding 
Corsica’s nationalist (separatist) movement.  
16. The first time that an official game was interrupted before its term since the 
creation of the French Soccer Federation in 1904  (Gastaut, Y. Les soccereurs 
algériens en France a l’épreuve des identités nationales, 
http://www.wearesoccer.org). 
17. For similar works on understanding peace after post-conflict see Pouliny (2004).  
18. This involves also the negotiation of the meaning (codes, beliefs, values) of 
nationality, collective ‘self’, social ties, religion, solidarity, the organization of 
collective work . 
19.  “You could read in Liberation’s front page “France–Algeria, after forty years of 
stoppage time”, Marianne responded by naming those who were involved in the 
interruption of the game as “boys of divorce”  (between France and Algeria) 
whereas Le Monde regarded the match of reconciliation between France and 
Algeria is still on” (Gastaut, Y. http://www.wearesoccer.org ). 
20. For some the arabisation policy has been imposed and over-politicised by the 
regime to maintain its control of political life. 
21. See the work of Ricoeur (translated in 2004) on history and memory and the 
notion of (institutionalised) inertia, selective memory and even forgetfulness. 
22. They do not express either their full belonging for social and historical 
considerations to “French culture” nor to their culture of origin. 
23. It should be mentioned here that the war of resistance in Algeria was not 
exclusively a war between ‘Muslims’ and ‘Christian’ French, because there were 
many Christians who fought for Algerian independence and many Muslims 
fought against independence.  Although reaffirming Islamic identity  as a form of 
differentiation and resistance was important against the colonial order because of 
its ambiguous game of defining colonialism in Algeria as a secular (civilising 
mission)  endeavour and at the same imposing on Algerians (the indigenous 
population) a denial of their Islamic identity as a condition to be accepted as full 
citizens (not indigenous)  in the colonial society.  
24. It was only in 1998 that the French Parliament recognised that what happened 
between 1954 and 1962 in the “Algerian territory” was not an internal conflict 
but a war. This recognition was a setback  with the recent French Parliament’s 
voting on 23 February 2005 on article 4 of law  n° 2005-158 which glorified the 
positive enterprise of French colonialism (the article was abrogated by 
presidential decision on February 16, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 235 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Amara, M. & Henry, I.  (2004).  Between globalization and local ‘modernity:  The 
diffusion and modernization of soccer in Algeria.  Soccer and Society, 5, (1): 
1-26.  
Begag, A.  (1998).  Ecrire et migrer, Ecarts D’identité, Revue trimestrielle sur 
l’intégration, N86.  Migration, Exil, Création. 
Begag, A.  (2002).  Les relations France-Algérie vue de la diaspora algérienne.  
Modern and Contemporary France, 10(4): 475-482. 
Ben Jelloun, T.  (1996).  Les raisins de la galère.  Paris: Libres Fayard. 
Berger, E.A. (1998). Algeria in Other(s)’ Languages: Toward a rethinking ofAlgeria’s 
linguistic predicament, Parallax, 4 (2): 43 - 46 
Billig, M.  (1995).  Banal Nationalism.  London:  Sage Publications. 
Boudjedra, R.  (1981).  Le vainqueur de coupe.  Paris:  Gallimard.  
Borradori, G. (2003). Philosophy in a Time of Terror, Dialogue with Jurgen 
Habermas and Jaques Derrida. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and 
London. 
Brian, E.  (2002).  Fanon’s al-Jaza'ir, or Algeria Translated.  Parallax, 8(2): 99-115. 
Breviglieri, M.  (2001).  L’étreinte de l’origine:  Attachement, mémoire et nostalgie 
chez les enfants d’immigrés maghrébins.  Confluences Méditerranée, 39 
(Automne).  Retrieved from http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/. 
Césari, J. (1997).  Faut-il Avoir Peur de l’Islam?  Paris:  Press de Science PO. 
Césari, J.  (1998).  Musulmans et républicains:  les jeunes, l’islam et la France, Paris: 
Complexe.  
Dombrowski, R.  Souad Massi Melancholy and Hope.  Translated from the German 
by Patrick Lanagan, Qantara.de 2005. Available in 
http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-310/_nr-244/i.html. 
Doukhan, R.  (1988).  Atouts et pièges de la particularité.  Confluences 
méditerranée,28,  Hiver).  Retrieved from 
http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/ 
Dine, P.  (2002).  France, Algeria and Sport:  From colonisation to globalisation.  
Modern and Contemporary France, 10(4): 495-505. 
Fabienne R.  (2000).  D’un imaginaire national à un autre:  comment peut-on être 
français quand on est d’origine algérienne?  Confluences Méditerranée, 39 
(Automne).  Retrieved from http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/ 
Fates, Y.  (1994).  Sport et Tiers Monde, Pratiques Corporelle.  Paris:  Presses 
University of France. 
Faucault, M.  (1997).  Il Faut Défendre la Société, Cours au Collège de France, 1976.  
Paris:  Gallimard, Seuil. 
Finkielkraut, A.  (1987).  La Défaite de la Pensée.  Paris: nrf, Gallimard. 
Flick, U.  (1998).  An Introduction to Qualitative Research.  London:  Sage 
Publications. 
Gastaut, Y. Les soccereurs algériens en France a l’épreuve des identités nationales. In 
“we are soccer, association (cultures, mémoires, histoire)” 
http://www.wearesoccer.org (accessed, 28/03/06). 
 
 
 236 
Geisser,V. and Kelfaoui, S. (2001). La nation d’origine réinventée La persistance du 
«mythe national» chez  les Français originaires du Maghreb, Confluences 
Méditerranée, 39, (Automne). http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/  
Gessey, P.  (2001).  Balancing acts:  Family and integration in the fiction of Franco-
Magherbi.  In Ireland. S., Proulx. P. S. (eds.), Immigrant Narratives in 
Contemporary France.  Contributions to the Study of World Literature, 
Number 106, (pp. 57-68).  London:  Greenwood Press. 
Harbi, M.  (2006).  Awsat Aljazaeeria asshamat bi aoudat khitab Tamjid al isstiamaar 
(Algerians have contributed in the return of the colonial discourse which 
glorifies colonialism).  Interview with Yacine Temlali for Aljazeera net.  
Retrieved 24/01/06 from (http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5F8FE1A6-
9662-4DB3-87D3633B1A21DBCC.htm)  
Hargreaves, A. G.  (2001).  Perceptions of ethnic differences in post-war France.  In 
Ireland. S., Proulx. P. S. (eds.), Immigrant Narratives in Contemporary France. 
Contributions to the Study of World Literature, Number 106, (pp 7-22).  
London:  Greenwood Press.. 
Kepel, G.  (1994).  A L’ouest D’Allah.  Paris:  Edition du Seuil. 
Khan, A. (1991). Algerian intellectuals: Between Identity and Modernity. In El-Kenz, 
A. (Ed.) Algeria: The challenge of Modernity.. London: CODEBRIA Books 
series. 
Lanfranchi, P and Wahl, A.  (1996).  The Immigrant as Hero:  Kopa, Mekhloufi and 
French Soccer.  International Journal of the History of Sport, 13 (March): 115-
127. 
Lanfranchi, P and Taylor, M.  (2001).  Moving with the Ball:  The Migration of 
Professional Soccerers.  Oxford:  Berg. 
Lamchichi, A.  (1999).  Islam et Musulmans de France:  Pluralisme, Laïcité et 
Citoyenneté.  Paris:  L’Harmattan. 
Lamchichi, A.  (2002).  Pluralisme et citoyenneté L’islam de France à l’épreuve de la 
laïcité et du «vivre ensemble» Confluences Méditerranée, 41, (Printemps). 
http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/ 
Lamont M., Morning A., and Moony M.  (2002).  Particular universalism:  North 
African immigrants respond to French racism.  Ethnic Racial Studies, 25(3): 
390-414. 
LeSueur J. D.  (2001).  Uncivil War:  Intellectuals and Identity Politics During the 
Decolonization of Algeria.  Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press. 
McKinney, M.  (2001).  Le jeu de piste:  Tracking clues to the emergence of 
Maghrébins-French literature in Farida Belghoul’s Georgette!  In Ireland, S., 
Proulx. P. S. (eds.), Immigrant Narratives in Contemporary France,  
Contributions to the Study of World Literature, Number 106, pp. 105-116.  
London:  Greenwood Press. 
Maldidier, D.  (1972).  Discours politique et guerre d’Algérie: approche synchronique 
et diachronique,  La pensée, 7/8 (June): 57-86. 
Manceron, G. (1996). Algérie, comprendre la crise. Brussels : Interventions.  
Manceron, G. (2002). "Colonisateurs et colonisés, face au souvenir colonial." 
Migration et Société, 81/82, (May-August): 121-138.  
Naïr, S.  (2003).  L’Empire Face à la Diversité,  Paris: Hachette 
Pouliny B.  Re-imagining peace after massacres:  a trans-disciplinary and comparative 
effort towards the rebuilding of functioning societies.  Summary proposal, 
CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, September 1, 2004.  
 237 
Ravenel, B.  (1996).  Mémoire, Histoire et Politique.  Confluences Méditerranée, 19, 
(Automne).  Retrieved from http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/ 
Ricoeur, P.  (2004).  Memory, History, Forgetting.  Translated by Kathleen Blamey 
and David Pellauer,  Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press. 
Said, E. W. (2000). Reflection on Exile, and other Essays. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Silverman, D. (ed.)  (1998).  Qualitative Research:  Theory, Method and Practice.  
London: Sage Publications. 
Scagnetti, J-C.  (2003).  Sport et retour au pays:  l’exemple de l’émigration algérienne 
en France, 1973-1978.  Migration 22(2): 40-46.  
Van Dijk, T. A.  (1985).  Handbook of Discourse Analysis (Vol. 4).  Amsterdam:  
Academic Press. 
Wetherell, M. and Potter, J.  (1982).  Mapping the language of racism:  Discourse and 
the  légitimation of exploitation.  London:  Harvester & Wheatsheaf. 
Withol, D.  (1995).  L’immigration, objet du débat politique, confluences 
Méditerranée, 14, (Printemps). Retrieved from 
http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/. 
 
Newspaper articles 
 
El-Moudjahid, « 78 minutes de bonheur, rubrique Sports», 07/10/01. 
El-Moudjahid, «Après France- Algérie- Le sport et…le rest», 09/10/01. 
El-Moudjahid, « Un enthousiasme débordant et bon enfant », 09/10/01. 
El-Watan, «Envahissement pacifique du terrain lors du match Algérie-France:  une 
fête gâchée», 7/10/01. 
El-Watan, «Ce n’était pas des hooligans», 08/10/01. 
El-Watan, «C’était le 5 juillet», 07/10/01. 
La Tribune, “Rien ne ce termine entre l’Algérie et la France,” 07/10/01. 
La Tribune, “Match historique,” 07/10/01. 
Le Matin, “Le Match de trop,” 07/10/01. 
Liberté, “Hélas la fête tourna court, de nos envoyés spéciaux a Paris,” 7/10/2001. 
Liberté, “Après les événements du match France-Algérie: la thèse du “coup monté,” 
08/10/01. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
